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Imlak Shaikh
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ABSTRACT
The paper aims to examine the relationship between stock
returns and terrorist attacks for the Indian securities market in last
30 years. The stock market returns have been modelled using con-
ditional volatility framework, and there are good enough shreds
of evidence to confirm that terrorist activity and cross-border ten-
sion has disrupted the investors’ sentiment. The market response
to the terrorist attack holds different facets like Target, Location,
Number-of-perpetrators, and Property-value has produced a signifi-
cant impact on the financial market. At the outset, attack day
hold an adverse effect on the market and remains unstable till
next few days followed by the recent terrorist attack. The results
also imply that market participant considers the nature of terrorist
attack in their portfolio selection and long-term investment strat-
egy. The practical implications of the study are threefold: (i)
investors do regard the terrorist attack in their investment pro-
posal (ii) investors take the short position due to terrorist attack
that result into the rise of general stock market volatility and (iii)
the financial planning within short-horizon gets postponed fol-
lowed by the recent terrorist attack.
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The 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S.A. manifested as one of the most significant ter-
rorist events in the history of the United States and around the world. The media
and politics have paid much attention to the terrorist threat and terrorist activity after
2001. The phenomenon of terrorist events challenged the present security system and
functioning of an economic system. The researcher, policymaker, and political system
attended to examine the global terrorism and, the literature is booming at a rapid
rate in the area of finance, economics and peace studies. The state and non-state
driven terrorist activities are increasing at an exponential rate and are the biggest
threat to human civilisation and the market economy.
The state-owned political conflicts and group ideology plays a significant impact
on the market economy. The economist calls this effect ‘fleeting effect’ on the secur-
ities market and markets’ fundamental. The September 11 attacks on the U.S.A. and
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the London Transport Bombings disturbed the functioning of the U.S and the
London Stock Exchange to such an extent that it took the markets almost a month to
recover completely. The 11/26, Mumbai attack disrupted the human life in Bombay
and posed uncertainty in financial markets, and it took at least one week to rebound.
The economics of terrorism speaks that terrorist attack may cause short-term disturb-
ance to the economic system; the people may decide to postpone their economic
activity due to such events. This kind of behaviour impacts the future of public con-
sumption and investment.
The positive side of the terrorism is: A terrorist attack has shown a positive impact
concerning economic effects on the military and national security market. The terror-
ist attacks aim to cause economic loss and financial and economic damages.
Regardless of the negative impact of terrorism, some actual foreign terror attacks
have shown limited cause to the stock markets. Let’s say the S&P500 returns drifted
between 0.90% and 31.5% and, on the average positive 14.2% on the global terrorist
attacks.1 The Frankfurt and London market were rallying in the positive direction,
and U.S. market recovered within a one-month horizon based on recent terrorist
attack. The attack on London, the market attained its normal level within one day,
and British GDP gained 0.8% in that quarter. At this point one can say that terrorist
attacks majorly affect in short-run on the economic growth, household consumption,
and turnover. Albeit, it has shown a positive impact on the state policy, security and
fiscal deficit expansion, etc.
If we look at the worst side of the economic damages due to terrorism, the tour-
ism market and holiday markets, airport security, Schengen area visa, surveillance
have been affected majorly. On the other hand, loss of job market and sharp fall in
the tourism and discouraged FDI is the recent adverse impact of terrorism. The resili-
ence, surveillance, international awareness, market regulation, and state authorities’
concerns have raised much attention on the part of global terrorism. Since, the incep-
tion of ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and other Islamic state groups,
the market became more alert and states have drawn their consideration on the above
issues.
This article aims to study the growth of the Indian Securities Market and also to
determine the impact of Terrorist attack on the Stock Markets in the last three deca-
des. The stock market returns have been modelled using conditional volatility frame-
work. The study attempts to estimate the conditional variance by modelling the
conditional volatility of Stock Market returns. It provides evidence towards the claim
that terrorist activity and cross-border tension has disrupted the investors’ sentiment.
The finance city Bombay (Mumbai) has suffered significantly regarding human and
monetary losses. The market response to the Terror attacks hold different facets: like
Target, Location, Number of perpetrators, and Property-value has produced a signifi-
cant impact on financial markets. The current study contributes in a three-fold man-
ner: (i) This is the first formal empirical attempt on terrorism studies in the
emerging market like India. (ii) The study takes a more extended sample period (i.e.,
30 years) into consideration and deliberates multiple factors of terrorist attacks. (iii)
A separate analysis of stock market performance has also been presented for
Mumbai attack.
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The empirical attempt has been organised as Section 2 describes the literature evi-
dences on stock market response followed by the terrorist attacks. Section 3 demon-
strates the data sources and composition. Section 4 devotes to the empirical design
and hypothesis building. Section 5 offers the detailed discussions and findings and
Section 6 ends with the summary and conclusion.
2. Literature evidences
Terrorist attacks result in many economic and social consequences. It damages to the
infrastructure, biological loss, environmental damages, loss of confidence in the mar-
ket and government, social disruption, failure of banking, trade and supply system.
2.1. Terrorism and economic growth
Enders et al. (2006) explore the impact of transnational terrorism on the flow of FDI
stock and found that such terrorist events hold a significant, but small, impact on the
stock of OECD nations. More specifically Turkey and Greece experienced substantial
fall in the FDI stocks. Koh (2007) demonstrates the relationship between terrorism
and economic growth. In his review, he argues that terrorist events have a short-lived
impact on the global tourism, airlines industries, and financial markets. Moreover,
the assets market demands a higher-risk premium for volatile assets. Whereas, the
long-lived effect of terrorism is the development in the R&D, Nuclear energy and the
new technologies to combat terrorism. Greenbaum et al. (2007) examine the terror-
ism and employment and business operations. The study uncovers the facts that ter-
rorist attack reduces the number of business operations and hampers the
employment followed by the terrorist attacks in the long-run. Mainly terrorism dis-
rupted the business formation and diversification. Hazam and Felsenstein (2007)
address the behaviour of the housing market in Jerusalem driven by terrorist events.
The study reveals that terrorism has the sharpest effect on the residential property
prices higher in the short-term while lesser in long-term.
Jackson (2008) examines the September 9/11 attack on the U.S. economy. He
explores the various facets of the economy, higher the catastrophic nature of such
attack. After the events, U.S. economy became more resilient. The financial market
remained closed for four days and corrected for such events. The consumer confi-
dence index (CCI) declined significantly and resulted in one more crisis (2007–08).
Overall, the terrorist attack has made U.S. economy stronger to meet the future
unwanted events. Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) argue that unemployment, poverty,
inequality, and dissatisfaction in term of social spending and welfare regimes result in
less domestic terrorism and vice versa. The directional causality is of two ways higher
the spending and generous welfare regimes. Sandler (2011) comprehensively elaborate
the sources and cause of world terrorism. He discusses the counter-terrorism, domes-
tic and transnational terrorism and preset the empirical evidence on the short and
long-run impact of terrorism on the income, legislative system, international relation,
economic growth, and financial development.
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Singh (2013) evidence the apparent impact of terrorism using the micro-level data
in the Punjab state of India. The study confirms that terrorism has disrupted the agri-
culture technology in long-term. Reduced the long-term fixed investment at the dis-
trict level. The wealthy farmer is more affected than the poor one living in terror
suspected area. Powers and Choi (2012) and Meierrieks and Gries (2013) studies the
impact of terrorism on business and economic growth. The study finds that terrorism
harms business activity, disrupts the flow of foreign investment, and raises the cost of
counter-terrorism. Hence, terrorism is seen to be detrimental to the flow of inter-
national fund and economic growth in African and middle-east nations.
2.2. Terrorism and financial markets
The literature presented in the previous section clearly evidence that terrorism is the
biggest threat for the human civilisation and economic growth. Terrorism causes not
only the consumption pattern but also the future finance and investment strategy of
the economy. Here we present some of the recent literature that uncovers the effects
of terrorism on financial markets such as equity, defence/airline/hospitality stock,
stock capitalisation, global stock market integration and international port-
folio selection.
Kim and Gu (2004) examine the impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the airline
stocks. The study conducted in the window of 60weeks pre and post 9/11 events.
The findings of the work reveal that average weekly returns do not change signifi-
cantly post the event of 9/11. The market risk and total risk increased irrespective of
the firms’ size. Unlike the previous studies, Schneider and Troeger (2006) study the
impact of terror and war between Israel and Palestinians on the global financial mar-
ket such as CAC, Dow Jones, and FTSE specifically from the years 1990 to 2000. The
work evidenced that conflict and war affect the financial market with negative
returns. They presented the work under the rational expectation of fiscal liberalism.
Lin et al. (2007) describe the consequences of the terrorist phenomenon concerning
9/11, Bali Bombing, Madrid Bombing, and London Bombing. The author argues that
terrorism creates more opportunities rather than a short-term disruption in the finan-
cial market. Nguyen & Enomoto (2009) study the impact of terrorism on the stock
returns and volatility-behaviour. The study administered on the KSE and TSE of
Pakistan and Iran. They observed significant, stock shifts and fluctuation in volatility
among these two markets. Kollias et al. (2011) examine the impact of terrorism on
large and small capitalised stocks. They find that size, maturity and some other fac-
tors of Terror attack are the primary determinants of markets.
Chang and Zeng (2011) explore the comprehensive dataset on the terrorist events
and study the behaviour of hospitality stock. The study reveals that market returns
are between 10% and 15% per annum. The nature of the attack, number of fatalities,
location, has shown a significant impact on the average daily rates of room
demanded. The findings explain that sentiment playing a substantial role in volatility
of hospitality stocks. Bilson et al. (2012) investigate the impact of terrorism on the
global stock market integration. The study resolves that terror induces substantial
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contagion in short-term and market integration effect on the domestic stock markets.
The market participant becomes more risk averse associated with the terrorist events.
Ramiah and Graham (2013) examine the September 11 and Bali bombing on the
London, Madrid and Mumbai stock exchange using the CAPM framework. The find-
ings show that stock portfolios were adversely affected due to domestic and trans-
national terrorist events. Kumar and Liu (2013) investigate the impact of terrorism
on the international stock markets. They find spill over effects among the trading
partners such as 2.5% reductions in the domestic equity indices. White et al. (2013)
explore the patterns of terrorist activity in South Asian countries; the study aims to
measure the risk, resilience, and volatility in these markets. They find that all these
three measures vary across the markets.
Aslam and Kang (2015) analyze the Asian stock markets using daily data on the
410 terrorist attacks between 1997 and 2011. The results indicate that terrorist events
are destructive for the equity market, more explicitly bombing and suicide attack gen-
erate significant downward movement in the market. Apergis and Apergis (2016)
recently reported the impact of Paris 11/3 terrorist attack on the stock prices in the
defense industry. The study shows the positive effect on the defence stock followed
by the recent Paris attack.
The stock market returns and volatility behaviour documented earlier regarding
international portfolio selection, stock-volume relation (e.g., Adler & Dumas, 1983;
Tauchen & Pitts, 1983), global asset pricing and contagion effects (e.g., Errunza &
Losq, 1985; Fields & Janjigian, 1989). More specifically, the performance of equity
market, political and macroeconomy under the shadow of global terrorism has been
explored by Enders and Sandler (1991; 1993; 1996). Additionally, Enders et al. (1992;
2006) describes the impact of terrorism on the tourism market and flow foreign dir-
ect investment.
There is quite a good number of empirical evidences that explore the impact of
terrorism to the domestic and transnational equity market (e.g., Carter & Simkins,
2004; Chen & Siems, 2004; Drakos, 2004; Glaser & Weber, 2005; Hon et al., 2004;
Mun, 2005). The study shows that contagion impact exists on the equity market,
negative abnormal return, high volatility, the rise in the idiosyncratic risk. In recent
decades, the political events and terrorist attacks (ISIS) has shown negative impact on
the stock market, macroeconomy, global equity market linkages, defence and airline
business, regional economy (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Amihud & Woh, 2004;
Chen & Siems, 2004; Drakos, 2004; Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Eckstein & Tsiddon,
2004; Hon et al., 2004; Khan & Estrada, 2016; Nikkinen et al., 2008; Enders &
Sandler, 2002).
Some of the recent pioneering works (e.g., Akerman & Seim, 2014; Apergis &
Apergis, 2016; Aslam & Kang, 2015; Karolyi & Martell, 2010; Kis-Katos et al., 2011;
Kollias et al., 2011; Larocque et al., 2010; Nikkinen & V€ah€amaa, 2010; Tahir Suleman,
2012) discusses the impact of terrorism and investor sentiment, stock market volatil-
ity and returns, global arms business. At this point, one can say that no study models
the investors’ sentiment and terrorism in the emerging markets like India. Our
research is novel and contributing to the literature on asset pricing and event studies.
More specifically, present work takes a more comprehensive approach in modelling
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the stock market volatility under various facets of terrorist attacks which are missing
in the previous studies.
3. Data sources and description
The study documents the stock market behaviour on the terrorist events for a more
extended period. The present work acquires the data openly available from Global
Terrorism Database (GTD), the database is maintained and disseminated via START
(Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism). The database collections headquar-
ter of GTD and START is at the University of Maryland, the database spans from
1970 to 2014.
GTD-Definition of Terrorism: The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or
actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic,
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in
order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes
must be present: 1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation
on the part of a perpetrator. 2. The incident must entail some level of violence or
immediate threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against
people. 3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does
not include acts of state terrorism2.[START, 2014 pp.9]
There are mainly two equity markets in India namely NSE and BSE located in
Mumbai (Bombay). First, according to World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), NSE
India is not only India’s leading stock exchange but also the world’s 4th largest
exchange based on trading volume in the capital market segment. Why Indian capital
markets are remaining first preference for the global investment in Asia is that
India’s FDI (US$44 billion) stood around 2% of India’s GDP. Second, BSE is the
worlds’ fastest growing stock exchange and the largest stock exchange regarding the
number of stock listings. BSE has been ranked 2nd in currency options and 3rd in
futures trading, and 10th as per market capitalisation among global stock exchanges3.
We have collected the daily data of stock price index from BSE. BSE is one of the
leading stock markets of India. The sample period ranges from 1972 to 2014.
Moreover, the data on NSE Nifty 50 and India’s volatility index (NVIX) are also col-
lected from the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India Ltd. The information on
equity and the terrorist attacks and responses has been organised and filtered for the
quantitative analysis. The GTD database encompasses many indicators of terrorist
attacks. For the present work, we screened only, the total number of terrorist events,
the total number of people killed, wounded, success, multiple, suicide, guncertain, and
property value. In additions, we have filtered major terrorist attacks during
1980–2014 took over the Mumbai city, a city of financial system and business hub of
the nation. In which we classified the events majorly in nine terrorist attacks (see
Table 4). The impact of such nine terrorist attacks on the Bombay stock exchange
has also been presented. When we extracted a dataset from the START database,
there were terrorist attacks on the weekend, e.g., on Friday/Saturday/Sunday. To
address the effects of such terrorist attack on the weekend, we sifted the event date
on next opening working day. The reason for shifting the event is that an attack on
the weekend will show the effects on the next working day of the stock exchange.
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4. Empirical model building
We examine the impact of terrorist events during the period 1980–2014 on the
Indian securities market. For the analysis of stock market returns a daily closing
price of the stock index has been considered. The BSE is one of the oldest and
leading stock markets in India, and Sensex 30 is the benchmark broader index.
The Sensex 30 is the representation of 90% of the Indian economy.
Let Pt be the closing price of BSE Sensex 30 at time t and rt ¼ lnPt -lnPt1; is the
contemporaneous log-transformed return on the stock index over the period t to
t 1. The empirical model has been presented in conditional volatility framework; let
us define the conditional mean and variance as,
mt ¼ Et1 rt½  (1)
rt ¼ Et1 rtmt½ 2 (2)
Where Et1½u signifies the expectation of particular factor u for the given informa-
tion at time t 1, very often is also written as E ujWt1f g: For our empirical model
the stock return rt is expressed through following process:
rt ¼ mt þ ffiffiffiffirtp 2t þ rt1 (3)
Where Et1½t ¼ 0 and Vt1½t ¼ 1, rt1 ¼ lagged returns, in order to control
autocorrelation, ftg  i:i:d:Fð:Þ; where F is the cumulative distribution function
of : More specifically we have structured the ARCH and GARCH framework for
eq. (3) as follows;
The mean equation is as follows:
rt ¼ x0 þ x1rt1 þ d1nkillt þ d2nwoundt þ d3successt þ d4propertyt
þd5suicidet þ d6multiplet þ d7guncertaint þ t (4)
Where nkillt and nwoundtare the two quantitative variables, while rest of the fac-
tors are dummy variables:e.g.,
successt ¼ 1 Successful attacks
¼ 0 Otherwise
propertyt ¼ 1 Property attacks
¼ 0 Otherwise
suicidet ¼ 1 Suicide attacks
¼ 0 Otherwise
multiplet ¼ 1 More than one day
¼ 0 Otherwise
guncertaint ¼ 1 Group suspected
¼ 0 Otherwise
The variance equation is calculated as;
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rt ¼ p0 þ
Xp




Based on the SIC criterion when GARCH (p, q) employed for p fi [1,5] and q fi
[1,2], GARCH (1,1) best suited in most of the cases (e.g., Smolovic, Lipovina-Bozovic,
& Vujosevic, 2017 and Wu et al., 2018), hence we calculated the parameters using
ARCH(1) and GARCH(1) model. A model with exogenous variance regressors: the
stock market volatility not only inflamed by its past but some other factors may also
contain the information to explain the market volatility (e.g., Bollerslev & Melvin,
1994; Mezrich & Engle, 1996 and Engle et al., 1990).
Hence, the variance equation with the exogenous terrorist events: such as i-day,
nprs, nkill, nwound, location:








l¼k qk1x1t þ qk2x2t (6)
Where;
iday ¼ event day;
Tattack ¼ terrorist attack on iday
x1t ¼ is the dummyv ariables; for iday and k ¼ 10 to
þ10 days from the Tattacks
x2t ¼ nkill; nwound; location; perpetrators
The framework explained above is based on the efficient market hypothesis (Fama
et al., 1969). The market participants evaluate the new information available publicly
and stunning from some unpredictable, political, environmental, economic and social
changes, which is reflected in the fair stock price (Schwert, 1981).
4.1. Hypotheses of the models
i. The intercept x0; the intercept term can assume either of the sign during the
non-terrorist attacks days. The present work takes into account the START
events hence during non-T-attacks days, if other macroeconomic, social and pol-
itical indicators play influencing role to explain the stock market performance.
Consequently, the intercept term should be different from zero and statistically
significant.
ii. The slope coefficient (di & qk): in our empirical model ds and qs measures the
intensity of the impact of T-attacks on the Indian securities market. If those
START events encompass some information to explain the future activity of the
stock market, then those slopes coefficient should remain different from zero
and statistically significant. The most recent studies (e.g., Akerman & Seim,
2014; Apergis & Apergis, 2016; Aslam & Kang, 2015) revealed that investors
regard the T-attacks in their market participation, due to terrorist events the
investors redefine their investment strategy in short-run and postpone their
financial consumption for future. The significant negative slope implies that due
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to the recent T-attacks stock market participation of investors has
been disrupted.
iii. i-day and pre-post T-attacks: T-attack dummies capture the impact of terrorist
events the day it took place, e.g., Mumbai 11/26, U.S. 9/11, etc. and surround
the i-days. If T-attack contains the information that impacts the behaviour of
investors’ sentiment than on the day of terrorist attacks the stock market will
adjust the events and stock price will reflect its fair value (Schwert, 1981). Some
of the empirical evidence (e.g., Aslam & Kang, 2015; Chen & Siems, 2004;
Jackson, 2008) state that T-attack has a short-run impact on the stock markets,
hence if T-attacks disrupt the short-run investment proposals then post events
dummies should be different from zero and negative, and statistically significant.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the summary of terrorist attacks happened during 1972–2014. One can
see that till 1986 there was no significant movement of terrorist activities, but from
1987 to 2014 the T-attacks become very abnormal to a large number of attacks. More
specifically, the T-attacks ranged from 150 to 800 between 2006 and 2014. There
were total 9096 T-attacks recorded according to GTD database in India for the given
sample period. It is seen that over a decade as there is an increased T-attacks resulted
in a high rate of fatalities and more perpetrators and terrorist gangs in India. There
Table 1. Summary of terrorist attack in India (1972–2014).
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
tevents 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 N/A 20 10 16
nperps 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 N/A 78 N/A 9
nkill 0 N/A N/A 4 0 0 N/A 31 17 24
nwound 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 19 13 12
No. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
tevents 13 47 159 39 96 166 362 324 349 339
nperps 7 24 162 34 72 146 603 65 95 479
nkill 64 59 195 51 340 506 971 874 907 1113
nwound 102 217 364 79 163 429 1,033 769 1042 1326
No. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
tevents 239 N/A 107 179 211 193 61 112 179 234
nperps 1,626 N/A 1,504 113 232 564 12 166 656 601
nkill 1,154 N/A 389 361 569 853 398 464 671 658
nwound 917 N/A 405 616 937 1416 411 591 760 1144
No. 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
tevents 183 196 108 145 166 154 517 673 662 642
nperps 418 177 62 270 1,061 675 3,856 6,317 8060 8264
nkill 595 472 334 463 721 635 765 784 812 484
nwound 1,182 1,183 949 1,216 2,137 1,210 1,559 935 673 725
No. 41 42 43
Year 2012 2013 2014
tevents 611 694 859 tevents¼ total terrorist attacks ¼ 9,096 nperps¼ number
of terrorist participation in attack ¼48,092 nkill¼ number
of people killed ¼ 17,953 nwound¼ number
of people wounded ¼ 26,732
nperps 1,905 7,107 2,672
nkill 264 467 488
nwound 651 771 776
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was a loss of human for 17,953 and people wounded around 20,732. We present
empirical evidence on T-attacks and stock market activity in the next section.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on various indicators of terrorist activities
and its response and stock market behavior for the last three decades. The table
shows that there was a loss of U.S.$5.2 million due to terrorist attacks in India and
total human fatality resulted into 44,685 peoples. The BSE Sensex 30 calculated aver-
age 7333.74 with 0.06 percentage returns for the sample period. We tested for the
ARCH effects up to six lags and found the presence of heteroskedasticity hence the
empirical framework is presented in the conditional volatility framework.
Figure 1 is the time series plot of BSE Sensex index and NSE Nifty index along
with NVIX volatility index followed by terrorist attacks for the period 1980–2014.
The stock market and T-attacks moving in the forward direction while the expected
stock market volatility (NVIX) was highest during 2005–2010 and found lowest after
2011. The second part of Figure 1 shows the plot of stock market volatility followed
by T-attacks and total fatalities. It is seen clearly that due to a high level of human
loss the stock market volatility remains high. For the given sample the market volatil-
ity was higher from 1990 to 1994 and 2006 to 2009. Figure 2 also presents the market
uncertainty due to T-attacks in the forms of crude stock market returns. Figure 3
explains the types of T-attacks occurred over the last three decades in India in vari-
ous ways. The graph demonstrates that majority of the attack was in the form of
Bombing and explosion, second highest was observed for Armed Assault.
5. Results and discussion
In this section, we present the empirical evidence on the terrorist attacks and its
impact on the Indian securities market. The entire estimation has been classified into
two parts. The first part describes the effects of the START on the India stock mar-
kets for the whole sample period 1980–2014. The assumption underlying quantitative
analysis is that T-attacks in any part of the country hold an impact on the Indian
financial markets. On the other hand, the T-attacks located in Mumbai only might be
showing higher incidence as compared to any other places, e.g., Delhi, Kolkata,
Chennai, etc. and Jammu & Kashmir. To consider this difference the analysis on
Mumbai T-attacks has been presented separately. Moreover, Appendix A has been
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
NPERPS NKILL NWOUND KW PROPVALUE($) SENSEX Returns
Mean 1414 513 764 1277 4014071 7333.43 0.0635
Maximum 8264 1154 2137 2858 30340000 29681.77 15.98
Minimum 7 17 12 30 1250 113.28 13.66
Std. Dev. – – – – – 7982.69 1.64
Skewness 1.9839 0.1015 0.3821 0.0822 2.3388 1.11 0.000
Kurtosis 5.5354 2.2948 3.0989 2.2235 7.0910 2.96 8.98
Sum 48092 17953 26732 44685 52182921 – –
ARCH(1) 517.42
ARCH(2) 322.06
Observations 34 35 35 35 13 8459 8458
Significant at 1% level of significance; NPERPS¼Number of perpetrators; NKILL¼Number of people killed;
NWOUND¼Number of people wounded; KW¼ Total fatality. Table presents the summary of descriptive statistics
followed by the number of T-attacks in India and BSE Index and stock returns.
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appended at the end showing variance inflation factor (VIF) to account for multicolli-
nearity. Since all values of VIF appears to be less than the threshold value, implies
that there is no issue of multicollinearity.
Figure 1. Terrorist attack and stock market performance (BSE-NSE-NVIX) [1980–2015].
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Table 3 describes the regression results on the terrorist attacks for the period
1980–2014. Table 3 has been classified into three different Models, Model 1: explains
the stock market volatility due to number of people killed and wounded, Model 2:
explores the nkill, nwound followed by dummies whether the events were successful,
and it was a suicide attack, Model 3: is holistic view of T-attacks and its response.
Figure 2. Number of fatality and stock market volatility.
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Figure 3. Type of terrorist attacks in India [1980–2014].
Table 3. Stock market returns and terrorist attacks [1980–2014].
Predictor:
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
Stock market returns Estimate z-stat Estimate z-stat Estimate z-stat
x0 0.0278 3.42
a 0.0487 2.07b 0.0465 1.96b
x1 0.4868 68.52
a 0.4870 68.49a 0.4869 68.26a
dnkill1 0.0078§ 3.66a 0.0076§ 3.53a 0.0073§ 3.34a
dnwound2 0.0019 2.14
b 0.0022 2.43b 0.0021 2.40b
dsuccess3 0.0081§ 0.32 0.0093§ 0.36
dsuicide4 0.1045§ 0.87 0.1043§ 0.86




a 0.0079 24.66a 0.0079 24.39a
pARCH 0.0597 36.79
a 0.0599 36.65a 0.0599 36.57a
pGARCH 0.9384 781.93
a 0.9383 778.30a 0.9383 775.54a
Adj: R2 0.22 0.22 0.22
LL 12462.2 12459.5 12458.8
DW  stat 2.04 2.04 2.04
Joint Hypothesis test
Wald F  stat 2.12c
p value 0.0949
Ho : dsuccess3 ¼dsuicide4 ¼dproperty5 ¼ 0
Joint Hypothesis test
Wald F  stat 1.92c
p value 0.1014
Ho : dsuccess3 ¼dsuicide4 ¼dproperty5 ¼ dmultiple6 ¼ dguncertain7 ¼ 0
[The mean equation is as follows:rt¼ x0 þ x1rt1 þ d1nkillt þ d2nwoundt þ d3successt þ d4 propertyt þ
d5suicidet þ d6multiplet þ d7guncertaintþ et The variance equation is calculated as;.
rt ¼ p0 þ
Pp




§- indicates expected sign as hypothesised.
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Table 3, Model 1 looking at the estimates all coefficients appears to be statistically
significant at 1% and 5% level. The Model 1 explains the stock market behavior on
the counterpart of fatality that caused due to terrorist attacks. The slope of the num-
ber of people killed in the various T-attacks shows a negative and statistically signifi-
cant impact on the stock returns. This also implies that human fatalities occurred due
to recent T-attack holds an adverse effect on the short-run calculation of the market
portfolio. About 0.78% value of the stocks are lost due to the human loss occurred
during this sample period. The similar kind of results noticed in the other models of
Table 3. The coefficient on the people wounded due to T-attacks shows a positive
impact on the market, its plausible explanation is, due to the survival of the people
who survived and became more resilient on the T-attacks. Now moving on the
Model 2, by including the dummies based on the T-attacks classified as a success,
property damage and multiple. The slope of all three factors appears to be negative
and statistically significant for multiples events. At this point, one can say that due to
success in the target followed by suicide attacks and T-attacks in the form of proper-
ties (e.g., Government property, Public property, etc.) shows a negative impact on the
performance of overall securities market. Among these three factors if T-attacks target
the property that causes more to the financial system. When we consider the impact
of T-attacks in the form of success, suicide and property jointly the Wald F-statistic
appears to be 2.12 and statistically significant at 10% level. This also makes sense that
the investor together considers the nature of T-attacks while formulating their short-
term investment proposal. Model 3 is more comprehensive that takes into consider-
ation of T-attacks those results into more than one-day events, and the terrorist
gang/group identified for such attacks. The estimates do not appear statistically sig-
nificant. This implies that these factors do not contribute to the stock market invest-
ment proposal for the given horizon.
Moreover, the joint impact of all five dummies on the stock market volatility
appears to be significant at the 10% level. The intercept coefficient in the entire
model seems to be positive and statistically significant. This connotes that during the
non-T-attacks day there are some other economic and political events that influence
the stock market behaviour. The coefficient of all ARCH and GARCH parameters
appears to be positive and significant, indicates that stock market volatility persists in
the portfolio selection and investment strategies. The log likelihood of Model 2 calcu-
lated highest; hence Model 2 best explains the returns behavior on the eve of T-
attacks in the Indian securities market. Figure 4 shows the volatility in the Indian
stock market during the T-attacks, the volatility was exceeded for the year 1986,
1991, 2000, 2006, and 2008–09.
Table 4 reports the major terrorist attacks on Mumbai (Bombay) and its impact
on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The Mumbai is the finance hub-city of India,
situated in the western part of province Maharashtra. For any terrorist group,
Mumbai remained the primary target for terrorist attacks, like 26/11 of Taj Hotel
attack on Mumbai. For the given sample period there were around 100 T-attacks hap-
pened in Mumbai. We shortlisted major nine events that occurred between 1980 and
2014 (See Table 4). The stock market returns on the significant nine T-attacks
appears to be negative with average 0.41%, and volatility was about 3.73 (i.e.,
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300.73%). The T-attacks resulted in the loss of civilians of 729 and 2637 people were
wounded. The majority of the events were driven by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) a ter-
rorist group. For one particular attack, on average four locations were targeted and in
most of the cases attacks were in the form of Bombing. The empirical evidence is
presented in Table 5.
Looking at Table 5, stock market and Mumbai T-attacks, we do have adequate
evidence to say that T-attacks contain the critical information to explain the
future stock market volatility. The empirical results reveal the facts that stock mar-
ket has been disrupted due to major T-attacks in the form of Bombing,
Assassination, Hostage, Car Bombing, at various locations of Mumbai. Such kind
of terrorist events makes investors more resilient for the future events. The
Mumbai a finance city of India feared and attacked several times in the history.
The investors do consider this event in their financial planning in the form of
short-run investment and become cautious about the long-term investments. We
document the stock market behavior in terms of i-day, pre and post events of T-
attacks. One can see from the Panels B, C and D of Table 5, the estimates on the
Figure 4. The Stock market volatility with regard to terrorist attacks during 1980–2014.







(%) Volatility nkill nwound Attack type Group
1 12-03-93 12-03-93 13 3 1.3242 8.9617 257 713 Car Bombing LeT
2 02-12-02 02-12-02 1 1 1.2783 0.9479 2 50 Bombing LeT
3 27-01-03 27-01-03 1 1 1.2287 0.9113 1 28 Bombing LeT
4 13-03-03 13-03-03 1 1 0.0592 1.2867 10 70 Bombing LeT
5 28-07-03 28-07-03 1 1 0.3563 1.8504 4 32 Bombing LeT
6 25-08-03 25-08-03 3 3 2.9644 1.1494 54 300 Car Bombing LeT
7 11-07-06 11-07-06 7 1 0.6569 4.8446 209 714 Train Bombing LeT
8 26-11-08 29-11-08 6 10 2.8202 12.1593 166 600 Bombing, Hostage,
Shooting
LeT
9 13-07-11 13-07-11 3 3 0.9966 1.5391 26 130 Explosive IM
Total 9 36 24 3.7739 33.6504 729 2637
Average 4 2.67 0.4193 3.7389 81 293
Source: GTD Database.
1758 I. SHAIKH
i-day appear to be negative as hypothesised in the econometric model. But do not
explain the significant impact on the same day of the attacks. At this stage, one
can say that a terrorist attack on the stock market plays a minimal effect on the
day of T-attacks. However, when we look around the T-attack days, the results
are speaking a different story. The information contained in the T-attacks hold
negative impact for the next several days of the market sentiment. The market
participant regards these events to take the right market position for the next
trading cycle. The Panel F of Table 5 shows the slope 0.01 after the 5th day of
the event and statistically significant, and the same is true for 1-day post from the
T-attack. These are some of the prima facie evidence that speaks that T-attacks
hold some impact on the investors’ sentiment with a 5-day horizon.
The investors’ sentiment and behavior are highly influenced by how many fatal-
ities occurred due to T-attacks. Hence, for any T-attacks number of people killed
and wounded is negatively associated with the stock market returns. It is seen
clearly from the Table 5, the slope of nkill appears negative and statistically signifi-
cant at 10% level of significance. The impact due to a number of people wounded
shows minimal impact on the Bombay stock exchange. For a terrorist group,
Table 5 Stock market return behavior with regard to Mumbai attacks [1980–2014].
Panel A : Stock market return behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qb101 qiday2 qa103 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.89 0.03 0.59 0.09§ 14889.23 2.01
Z-stat 5.45 a 8.65 a 13.56 a 22.35 a 197.83 a 0.65 0.98 1.73 c
Panel B : Stock market return behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qiday1 qa12 qnkill3 qnwound4 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.89 0.68§ 0.27§ 0.08§ 0.02 14886.93 2.01
Z-stat 5.50 a 8.68 a 13.65 a 22.35 a 197.27 a 0.51 0.25 1.69 c 1.54
Panel C : Stock market return behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qiday1 qa52 qnkill3 qnwound4 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.89 0.77§ 0.04§ 0.08§ 0.02 14886.98 2.01
Z-stat 5.49 a 8.69 a 13.64 a 22.35 a 197.46 a 0.81 0.27 1.74 c 1.54
Panel D : Stock market return behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qb51 qiday2 qa53 qnkill4 qnwound5 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.89 0.06 0.97§ 0.04§ 0.08§ 0.02 14886.81 2.01
Z-stat 5.49 a 8.68 a 13.64 a 22.35 a 197.46 a 0.31 0.84 0.28 1.65 c 1.54
Panel E: Stock market volatility behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qiday1 qnkill2 qnwound3 qnpers4 qlocation5 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.05 0.98 0.00 0.11 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.001§ 0.30 0.39§ 5475.33 1.91
Z-stat 6.35 a 232.13 a 51.96 a 87.99 a 1140.63 a 2.02 b 22.74 a 70.77 a 127.82 a 38.99 a
Panel F : Stock market volatility behavior
;0 ;1 u0 uARCH uGARCH qiday1 qa52 LL DW-stat
Estimate 0.04 0.98 0.00 0.11 0.92 0.02 0.01§ 5438.98 1.92
Z-stat 6.38 a 251.94 a 61.10 a 99.61 a 1448.93 a 2.20 b 5.55 a
[The mean equation is as follows: rt¼ ;0þ ;1 rt1 þ 2t; 2t  Nð0; rt) And the variance specification with the
exogenous factor is: rt ¼ u0 þ uARCH 22t1þ uGARCH rt1 þ qikFactors Where i¼ various exogenous factors such
as T-events, events before and after, nkilll, nwound, location and perpetrator].
Significant at a1%,b5%,c10%.
§- indicates expected sign as hypothesised.
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location remains the main concern for T-attacks. Any T-attacks aim to disrupt the
economic activity and create the situation of uncertainty. As we can see from Table
4, on average 4 locations were targeted in the Mumbai attack. The slope of the loca-
tion appears to be 0.39 (Panel E) with significant adverse impact on the stock
market returns. This implies that location causes more loss to investors in short-run
due to T-attacks.
Moreover, we investigated the impact of a number of perpetrators participated in
one particular T-attack. The results indicate that when it is known to the market par-
ticipant that how many terrorists involved in the T-attack, which makes more clarity
about the future events. In this case investors become more specific, consequently,
number-of-perpetrators show a positive impact on the stock market behavior. The
slope of the ARCH and GARCH parameters estimated as positive and statistically sig-
nificant, this signifies that volatility persists in the stock market due to terrorist activity.
The log likelihood was highest for Panel E that explains the stock market volatility.
The Panel E and F report the stock market volatility during T-attacks on the Bombay
stock exchange. We calculated the stock market volatility using the GARCH model and
generated the stock variance series for the sample period. The results represented in
Panel E and F signifies that on the i-day, volatility rises significantly and it is positive
when there is a high degree of fatality. The number of people participated in the terror-
ist activity also hold a positive impact on the future stock market volatility. Figure 5 is
the time series plot of stock market volatility due to Mumbai attacks. One can see
clearly that volatility was very high during 1990–1995, and second highest level was dur-
ing 2005 and 2008–09, around these periods maximum T-attacks were took place.
6. Summary and conclusion
The study investigated the behavior of the stock market for the emerging economy
like India. The sample period ranged from 1980 to 2014. We took the stock market
Figure 5. The stock market volatility with regard to Mumbai terrorist attack 1980–2014 on
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).
1760 I. SHAIKH
data and showed that how Terrorist attacks impound the important information that
influences the stock market returns. For the given sample there were total 9069
Terrorist attacks that resulted in the total fatality of 17,953 and 26,732 people were
wounded. The stock market functioning disrupted due to these events and more spe-
cifically those that occurred near the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The information
contained in the terrorist attacks hold negative impact for the next several days of the
market sentiment. The empirical results show that the market remained more uncer-
tain due to the number of fatalities that occurred and the locations that were targeted.
In a successful terrorist attack the impact of property targeted and suicide attacks were
more on the stock market in comparison to multiple and gang suspected in the attacks.
The Mumbai, a finance city of India feared and attacked several times in the history.
The investors do consider this event in their financial planning in the form of short-
run investment and become cautious about the long-term investments. It is also clearly
evidence that i-day holds a negative impact on the markets and the markets tend to
remain unstable for next few days. The results also suggest that market participant
considers the nature of terror attacks in their portfolio selection and long-term invest-
ment strategy.
According to global terrorism report (Miller & Kammerer, 2017), it is reported
that around 10,900 terrorist attacks have happened across the world, and it has killed
about 26,400 civilians. Till 2017 the number of terrorist attacks has been declining,
and it is the outcome of proactive measures of the respective state. Looking at the
geographical location of the attacks more than half of the attacks were located in
Iraq, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. There is no reason to believe that terrorist
activity effects the consumption and investment behavior. Hence, to reinforce the
finance and investment flow locally and internationally a local government has to
invest more concerning home security and surveillance. The practical implications of
the study are threefold: (i) investors do regard the T-attacks in their investment pro-
posal (ii) investors take the short position due to T-attacks that results into the rise
of general stock market volatility and (iii) the financial planning within short-horizon
gets postponed followed by recent T-attack.
Notes
1. 1. 04/11/1979, Iran hostage crisis; 2. 23/10/1983, Beirut Bombing; 3. 21/12/1988, Pan-Am
103 Bombing; 4. 07/08/1998, Kenya embassy; 5. 20/03/1995, Sarin gas Tokyo; 6. 12/10/
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